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Background: Ontario’s 36 Public Health Units (PHUs) were responsible for implementing the H1N1 Pandemic
Influenza Plans (PIPs) to address the first pandemic influenza virus in over 40 years. It was the first under conditions
which permitted mass immunization. This is therefore the first opportunity to learn and document what worked
well, and did not work well, in Ontario’s response to pH1N1, and to make recommendations based on experience.
Methods: Our objectives were to: describe the PIP models, obtain perceptions on outcomes, lessons learned and
to solicit policy suggestions for improvement. We conducted a 3-phase comparative analysis study comprised of
semi-structured key informant interviews with local Medical Officers of Health (n = 29 of 36), and Primary Care
Physicians (n = 20) and in Phase 3 with provincial Chief-Medical Officers of Health (n = 6) and a provincial Medical
Organization. Phase 2 data came from a Pan-Ontario symposium (n = 44) comprised leaders representing: Public
Health, Primary Care, Provincial and Federal Government.
Results: PIPs varied resulting in diverse experiences and lessons learned. This was in part due to different PHU
characteristics that included: degree of planning, PHU and Primary Care capacity, population, geographic and
relationships with Primary Care. Main lessons learned were: 1) Planning should be more comprehensive and
operationalized at all levels. 2) Improve national and provincial communication strategies and eliminate
contradictory messages from different sources. 3) An integrated community-wide response may be the best
approach to decrease the impact of a pandemic. 4) The best Mass Immunization models can be quickly
implemented and have high immunization rates. They should be flexible and allow for incremental responses
that are based upon: i) pandemic severity, ii) local health system, population and geographic characteristics,
iii) immunization objectives, and iv) vaccine supply.
Conclusion: “We were very lucky that pH1N1 was not more severe.” Consensus existed for more detailed planning
and the inclusion of multiple health system and community stakeholders. PIPs should be flexible, allow for
incremental responses and have important decisions (E.g., under which conditions Public Health, Primary Care,
Pharmacists or others act as vaccine delivery agents.) made prior to a crisis.
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In 2009, a novel strain of H1N1 influenza triggered the
WHO to declare a pandemic. This paper will describe
the experiences and lessons learned by the response to
this pandemic in Ontario, Canada. In Canada, the fe-
deral government has a limited role in the direct deli-
very of health care services, including Public Health
responses to epidemics. Its role is primarily in the realm
of developing national standards, co-ordinating re-
sponses across jurisdictions and providing financial sup-
port through defined arrangements with the provinces
and territories that deliver mandated services. It has a
direct role only for specific populations such as Aborigi-
nal peoples and the military. Provinces and territories
play the lead role in the financing and delivery of health
care services and public health services. In Ontario,
some functions, such as province wide co-ordination
and topic specific expertise are managed centrally
through Public Health Ontario and the Office of the
Chief Medical Officer, while most day to day program
delivery falls to local Public Health Units (PHUs). Each
of Ontario’s 36 PHU’s is supported by a mix of provin-
cial and municipal financing, is governed by an inde-
pendent Board and has its own Medical Officer of
Health (I.e., CEO). As responsibility for delivery of in-
fectious disease prevention and control programs, in-
cluding those for vaccine preventable diseases such as
influenza falls to local PHUs, each local PHU was re-
quired to both develop and implement its own Pan-
demic Influenza Plan (PIP) [1].
The H1N1 experience provided a unique opportunity
to document different approaches and outcomes to the
pandemic influenza at the local level. Our objectives
were: 1) to document stakeholder experiences and
perceptions relating to five key characteristics of PHU
Pandemic Influenza Plans: i) planning and implementa-
tion, ii) human and financial resources, iii) priority
lists/vulnerable populations, iv) mass immunization,
and v) collaboration with Primary Care/Family physi-
cians; 2) to compare differences among local PHU
Pandemic Influenza plans; 3) to document stakeholder
perceptions of what worked well and didn’t work well;
and 4) to identify policy suggestions regarding changes
needed to improve local health system pandemic influ-
enza plans.
Methods
We conducted a three-phase comparative analysis study
based upon a modified approach to the frameworks
described by Patton [2], Walk [3] and Vega [4]. Each
phase built upon the previous one. The Queen’s Univer-
sity Health Sciences & Affiliated Teaching Hospitals Re-
search Ethics Board approved the study protocol (Study
Code: EPID-311-10).Phase 1
This phase consisted of semi-structured key informant
interviews with local Medical Officers of Health (n = 29
of 36 PHUs) and Primary Care/Family physician leaders
(n = 20) across Ontario. The physicians were identified
with assistance from the Ontario Medical Association
and the Ontario College of Family Physicians.
Separate PHU and Primary Care physician instruments
were used with the Primary Care instrument being shorter
and focused on a Primary Care physician perspective.
However, both survey instruments were designed to ad-
dress questions in main components of the PIPs: 1) Plan
for Influenza Pandemic; 2) Vulnerable/Priority Popula-
tions; 3) Mass Immunization Model; 4) Financial and
Human Resources Capacity; and 5) Collaboration with
Primary Care/Family Physicians. The same two investiga-
tors conducted all of the interviews. For each component
category respondents were asked: a) to describe what was
implemented; b) to identify components or approaches
that worked well and didn’t work well; c) to describe
things they would do differently next time; and d) to pro-
vide policy suggestions for Public Health, Primary Care/
Family physicians or Government, about improving a pan-
demic response. We also asked category specific questions.
A much abbreviated overview of the instrument questions
is illustrated below.
Public Health Unit and Primary Care/Family Physician
Key Informant Questions
Plan for Influenza Pandemic (PIP)
 Did your PHU have a documented PIP in place
prior to H1N1; if so, what guided your response?
Was there a separate Community Pandemic
Influenza Plan?
 Describe components of your PIP that worked well
and that did not work well.
 What were your lessons learned, things you would do
differently, and policy suggestions (E.g., to Public
Health, Primary Care and the provincial government)
for improvement? [Note – this question was asked for
each of the following categories.]
Vulnerable and Priority Populations
 How did your PHU use the Ministry of Health and
Long-term Care priority populations list? Did you
adapt or modify the list and sequencing guidelines?
Mass Immunization Delivery Model (MIM)
 Describe your Mass Immunization Model including
how the vaccines were delivered (I.e., individuals
vaccinated) after they were made available?
 Describe components of your MIM that worked
well and did not work well?
Financial and Human Resources
 Including the additional funds provided by the
provincial government, did your PHU have sufficient
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designed?
 Was your PIP designed to rely on PHU staff or did
it rely on the hiring of additional staff or volunteers?
Collaboration with Primary Care/Family Physicians
 Describe the role of Primary Care during the
development and the implementation phases of the
PIP.
 Use the provided 5-point Himmelman Scale [5] to
rate the level of collaboration.
 With respect to future outbreaks, do you believe the
level of collaboration between the local PHU and
Primary Care should increase, decrease or remain
the same?
Phase 1 data analysis
All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.
We employed a comparative case study methodology to
identify thematic categories (E.g., communication, planning
or feelings) and trends (E.g., frequent and similar responses
among PHUs and Primary Care/Family physicians).
Public Health and Primary Care transcripts were
grouped by Pubic Health unit peer group categories. A
peer group is a cluster of Public Health units, identified
by Statistics Canada as having similar social, demo-
graphic and economic characteristics [6]. Transcripts
from the PHUs (n = 29) and Primary Care/Family physi-
cians (n = 20) were separated into the following peer
groups for preliminary analysis: Rural Northern Re-
gions, Mainly Rural, Sparsely Populated Urban–rural
Mix, Urban/Rural Mix, Urban Centres, and Metro
Centre-Toronto. Physician and PHU transcripts from
the same PHU peer group were analyzed separately. Re-
sponses to specific questions in each category were
manually identified and collated into lists. Additional
responses; such as to questions the respondents felt
should have been asked but were not, were coded (E.g.,
program description, worked well, didn’t work well, do
differently, and policy suggestion) and then added to the
appropriate collated list. The lists were then assessed
for frequency of similar responses, common themes and
insightful/notable responses. The results of Phase-1
were used to develop the agenda and questions for
Phase 2 and Phase 3.
Phase 2
In this phase we conducted a pan-Ontario symposium
(n = 44 participants) where we combined the Nominal
Group Technique [7,8] and the Electronic Meeting Sys-
tem approach to generate consensus and develop priori-
tized lists. Participants were identified based upon their
employment status and experience as decision-makers
and experts in Primary Care or Public Health during
pH1N1. Participants included experts from: OntarioPHUs, Family Health Teams and Primary Care/Family
physicians (n = 17), Ontario Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care (MOHLTC), Ontario Association for
Health Protection and Promotion (OAHPP), Associ-
ation of Local Public Health Agencies (aLPHa), Com-
munity Health Centres, the Public Health Agency of
Canada (PHAC), and the Ontario Federation of Indian
Friendship Centres (OFIFC). The prioritized lists were
generated from the research questions in four main
categories illustrated.
Symposium Questions
Mass Immunization Models: Components & Issues
 What are the characteristics of a good Mass
Immunization Model?
 What should we do to improve our ability to
respond the next time?
Influenza Assessment Centres
 What do we need to do differently to improve our
ability to respond?
 Roles/Responsibilities: Who should take the lead?
Effective Partnerships: Public Health & Primary Care
Physicians
 What can Public Health or other Government
organizations do to facilitate partnerships and better
engage Primary Care?
 What can Medical Organizations and local Primary
Care do to better partner with and engage Public
Health?
Information, Research Needs and Other
 What additional information do we need from
research or other sources to develop a better
response?
 What other things do we need to consider, do
differently, or improve to develop a better overall
response?
Phase 2 data analysis
The symposium methods permitted the completion of
both data extraction and data analysis during the sympo-
sium. By combining the Nominal Group Technique with
the Electronic Meeting System approach the facilitator
guided the 44 participants through the symposium ques-
tions to reach group specific (E.g., Primary Care Physi-
cians or Public Health) or participant-wide consensus on
responses and then to develop the final prioritized lists
(E.g. Consensus on the Top 5–10 solutions) which were
displayed onscreen for the participants to review.
Phase 3
Phase 3 consisted of short key informant interviews with
Chief-Medial Officers of Health in Canadian Provinces/
Territories (n = 6) and with one provincial Medical Asso-
ciation. Questions were derived from the themes identified
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compare the Ontario experiences and lessons learned to
those in other provinces/territories and to obtain policy
suggestions from the top level decision-makers in other
provinces. A sample of Phase-3 Questions is illustrated in.
Phase 3 Key Informant Interview Questions
 What are the characteristics of a good mass
immunization model?
 In Ontario, there existed a mismatch in the roles of
Public Health and Primary Care, in terms of
prescribed authority and responsibility over the
implementation of influenza assessment centres
(FACs). This led to poorly operationalized policy
and procedures on several levels, ranging from
funding to staffing and other logistics. Did you find
this to be an issue in your province’s response to
H1N1?
 Were partnerships between Public Health and
Primary Care an issue?
 With the objective of developing a better response
for the next time, what two or three policy
suggestions would be at the top of your list?Phase 3 data analysis
The Phase 3 survey instruments were very short and
intended to address some main themes from the previ-
ous two phases. The data analysis approach used was
the same as for Phase 1.Results
Overview
Our three-phase comparative analysis study generated
data from 56 key informant interviews (E.g., which
resulted in 1,300 transcription pages) and the policy
suggestions and prioritized lists from the 44 symposium
participants. In this paper, we present the main themes,
lessons learned and policy suggestions from all three
phases.
The first theme that emerged was the high level of
interest associated with discussing and evaluating the
H1N1 experience. For example, Canada’s Chief Medical
Officer of Health agreed to participate as did the Chief
Medical Officers of Health in 7 Canadian provinces/ter-
ritories and the Medical Officers of Health in 29 of
Ontario’s 36 Public Health Units (81%). Participants also
included senior level decision makers from: i) provincial
medical organizations; ii) the Ontario Ministry of Health
and Long-term Care; iii) Public Health Ontario; and iv)
the Ontario Federation of Indian Friendship Centres. In
addition, Primary Care/Family physicians identified as
leaders by their provincial medical organizations partici-
pated in Phases 1 and 2.The second theme that emerged was the degree of re-
sidual experienced-based emotion. This was quite notable
given that the project took place over a year following
H1N1. For example, the separate PHU and Primary Care
instruments were designed to be completed in 35–45 mi-
nutes (PHU) and 10–15 minutes (Primary Care). How-
ever, Key Informants had much to say which resulted in
interviews ranging between 60–130 minutes for Public
Health and 25–70 minutes for Primary Care/Family physi-
cians. As the interviews progressed and memories were
refreshed, it was common for respondents to increasingly
speak quicker and louder, to include the occasional exple-
tive or to restate what we said earlier about the responses
being anonymous and that the recordings would be
destroyed. These emotions and responses appeared to in-
dicate that H1N1 was to some degree traumatic for both
Public Health and Primary Care and that this was related
to the uncertainty of implementing something new and
the desire to do the best at what they were trained to do
but under conditions where they often felt constrained by
multiple system-level factors or other planning and logis-
tical related issues.
The third theme that emerged was the degree of vari-
ation in the local responses. For example, responses
ranged from PIPs that were developed and delivered al-
most exclusively by the local PHU to a broader more
integrated community-wide approach that resulted in
‘Community-Pandemic Influenza Plans’ (Community-
PIPs) which were local system-wide responses that were
developed, owned and implemented by a broad range of
local community and health system (E.g., Public Health,
Primary/Acute Care and EMS) stakeholders. PIPs also
varied in their approaches to mass immunization. Some
were enhanced versions of the seasonal Flu model with
a high degree of dependency upon Primary Care;
whereas, other models were PHU administered high
volume clinics with no or little reliance on Primary
Care. We found that these differences were in part due
to expectations or uncertainty regarding vaccine supply
(E.g., when available and how much) and different local
health system characteristics that included: a) PHU size,
capacity and planning; b) population make-up, size,
density and location (urban, rural/northern); c) histor-
ical relationships between the PHU and Primary Care/
Family physicians and other providers; and d) seasonal
influenza programs.
Lessons learned and policy suggestions
Five categories that emerged include: 1) The Need for
More Comprehensive Planning, 2) Local Health System
Integration and Community-PIPs, 3) Communication,
4) Lack of Consensus on the Best Model for Mass
Immunization, and 5) Provincial Policy and Northern
and Rural Public Health Units. A summary of the main
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response is presented in the following section.
1) The need for more comprehensive planning
There was a high degree of consensus for the need for
more comprehensive and detailed planning. Participants
in all three phases identified this need at multiple levels
(E.g., local, provincial and federal). Additional informa-
tion to support the need for more planning at the local
level came from the Phase 1 questions. We asked the
Medical Officers of Health to describe their documented
PIPs. Then in an attempt to identify how well their PIP
met their needs, we asked the question: “Considering
the issues and challenges that arose during the H1N1
pandemic, to what degree do you believe that your PIP
met your needs?” (E.g., 0% = PIP did not address any of
the issues/challenges, 100% = PIP addressed all issues/
challenges).
PIPs ranged from short ‘Strategic’ documents; which
broadly described what was intended to be implemented,
to fully ‘Operationalized Policy/Procedure Manuals’ that
detailed how the plans were to be implemented and
which outlined the needed decisions and had structures
and agreements in place. We found that the majority of
the Medical Officers of Health described their PIPs as
being closer to a ‘Strategic’ document (65%) and that in
those PHUs the Medical Officers of Health were more
likely to indicate that their PIP addressed fewer of the
total issues and challenges that arose during H1N1. For
example, the average score on the degree question was
68% (range 40% - 80%) in PHUs with ‘Strategic’ PIPs ver-
sus 81% for the PHUs that described their PIPs as being
more fully ‘Operationalized’ (range 75% - 90%).
Staff at the PHUs with more detailed PIPs appeared to
experience less stress, fewer delays and unforeseen prob-
lems. In one example, a PHU learned during a crisis
situation that the main facility planned for their mass
immunization clinic was inadequate because it was not
assessed for the needed electrical and IT capacity. An-
other more common example was associated with not
involving the Human Resources Department in planning
and problems such as: a) PIPs that were designed with
the expectation of hiring emergency staff but which did
not recognize that the HR department lacked the cap-
acity to process the new hires quick enough; b) a lack of
formalized agreements with Nursing Agencies or other
providers and having to draft agreements in a time of
crisis; and c) inadequate or missing staff redeployment
models and policy.
2) Local health system integration and community-PIPs
“Pandemics affect the whole community; whereas, the
whole community can affect the impact of a pandemic”.
There was consensus that the best local response wouldbe a well-integrated local health system response with
additional support from multiple community stakeholders.
Consensus also existed for the needed support from both
the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care and Medical
Organizations to facilitate better local integration. Key
themes that emerged in this category were: i) Influenza
Assessment Centres; ii) Community Pandemic Influenza
Plans; iii) Public Health and Primary Care Collaboration;
iv) Local Health Integration Networks; and v) PHU Geo-
graphic Boundaries.
Influenza assessment centres (FACs) FACs were
intended to assess and treat residents who were experi-
encing an influenza-like illness. During a pandemic in-
fluenza outbreak they were also expected to alleviate
pressures and congestion from local hospitals, allowing
emergency rooms to focus on treating people who are
critically ill or have life-threatening illnesses or injuries.
In Ontario, there existed a mismatch or lack of clarity
regarding the roles of Public Health and Primary Care/
Family physicians, in terms of prescribed authority and
responsibility over the implementation of FACs. This led
to poorly operationalized policy and procedures on
several levels ranging from funding to staffing and other
logistics. Subsequently, this created barriers and timing
issues that prevented or delayed decisions about opera-
ting FACs.
Community pandemic influenza plans (C-PIPs) At
the local level, the ability to respond to a pandemic is af-
fected by the degree of collaboration among all commu-
nity stakeholders (e.g.: health system, emergency response,
fire, police, education, and municipal government). C-PIPs
developed by all local stakeholders delineate agreed-upon
roles and responsibilities. Respondents generally agreed in
the value of developing C-PIPs.
Public health and primary care collaboration There
was almost 100% consensus for the need for more or
better collaboration between Public Health Units and
Primary Care/Family Physicians while developing and
implementing the PIPs. There also existed agreement
that the Ministry of Health and Long-term Care and
Medical Organizations (E.g., Ontario Medical Associ-
ation and Ontario College of Family Physicians) should
facilitate this process. Below we present a few notable
quotes that illustrate themes relating to planning and
local health system integration.
Notable Quotes on Planning and Local Integration
 “The plan was not as well operationalized as was
needed for a crisis situation. Our plan described what
we wanted to do but not the details of how we were
going to do it.” (PHU Medical Officer of Health)
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people before a time of crisis, it’s not going to happen
in a time of crisis.” (PHU Medical Officer of Health)
 “The Province should incorporate in its pandemic
plan the use of Primary Care and others as vaccine
delivery agents. Their plan excluded that and we
know from our experience and from having done
the math that if we’d had to do this without
partners it would have taken us a year to fully
vaccinate the population. We need the entire system
to be able to make this work effectively”. (PHU
Medical Officer of Health)
 “Health system integration is critical [so that doctors,
hospitals, public health are all accountable to the
same organization, and incentives are aligned]. This
will only be achieved at the provincial level with
significant political will.” (Primary Care Physician)
 “The Regional Health Authority (RHA) model
worked well and served to bridge communication
and partnerships between Public Health, Primary
Care, Acute Care and other Health System
stakeholders.” “The advantage of RHA system is that
our deputy minister can call the RHAs and then
quickly have Public Health and Medical leaders and
talk to all at the same time…… this is a tremendous
capacity when it comes to planning. “ (Provincial
Chief Medical Officer of Health)
 “Primary care should have been engaged earlier and
more effectively in planning and implementation.”
(Primary Care Physician)
 “…there is no coordinating, there is no
organizational structure to Primary Care so it’s hard
to know who’s going to represent Primary Care in
any discussions and I think that’s half the problem
as well.” (PHU Medical Officer of Health)
 “The original plan called for Primary Care doctors to
take care of their own patients as with the regular
flu season. However, many refused during H1N1
because of the provincial tracking/documentation
guidelines which were considered too laborious.”
(PHU Medical Officer of Health)
 “Some MDs would not work in a clinic if their
family members were not immunized and if he
could bring it back to their family. This needs to be
decided.” (Decision-maker – Provincial Medical
Organization)
Local health integration networks (LHINs) Ontario’s
LHINs had little involvement in the PIP development
and implementation phases. Consensus existed for in-
creased LHIN involvement. For example LHINs were the
top ranked answer to the symposium question regarding
FAC policy that asked: Who should take the lead? (See
LHIN Below).Ontario’s Local Health Integration Networks (LHINs)
In 2006, Ontario created 14 LHINs which function as
non-profit corporations that work with local healthcare
and community providers to determine health services
priorities within each LHIN. The LHINs plan, integrate
and fund health services that include: hospitals, commu-
nity care access centres, community support services,
long-term care, mental health, addictions and community-
health centres [9]. Notable differences when comparing
LHINs in Ontario to Regional Health Authorities (RHA)
in other Canadian Provinces include: a) the absence of
Public Health Services as a responsibility of LHINs, and b)
LHIN and PHU geographic boundaries are not the same
(E.g., 36 Public Health Units are located geographically
within the 14 LHINs with some PHUs areas in multiple
LHINs).
Geographic boundaries
Ontario has 36 PHUs and 14 Local Health Integration
Networks that do not all share the same geographic boun-
daries. Consequently, this complicated efforts to achieve co-
ordinated regional responses. In the Phase-3 interviews,
Chief Medical Officers of Health in other provinces with
Regional Health Authority (RHA) models indicated that
one strength of the RHA model is coordination such as the
ability to get all key regional health system stakeholders/
leaders to the table with a single phone call.
3) Communication
There is a need to improve both national and provincial
communication strategies to both PHUs and Primary
Care. Communications and guidelines often arrived later
than desired, came from multiple sources, were often
contradictory and didn’t address the different needs of
rural/northern PHUs. Medical Officers of Health also
indicated that it would help if provincial Ministry of
Health communications and teleconferences came from
one source and were held earlier in the day to allow time
to implement the needed changes. In addition, Primary
Care physicians reported that contradictory messages or
guidelines from Public Health and Medical Organiza-
tions created confusion and problems because their pa-
tients were hearing one thing from Public Health but
being told something different by them in the office.
They indicated the need to collaborate to create consis-
tent messages.
4) Lack of consensus on the best model for mass
immunization
There was no consensus regarding the best model for
mass immunization. Opinions on models ranged from:
a) Public Health directed/operated high volume clinics
where vaccines are only available at the clinics; to b) en-
hanced regular flu season approaches where Public Health
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ance on Primary Care/Family Physicians to provide most
of the vaccines. However, there was consensus that the
most appropriate model should be based upon:
 Quick implementation time and immunization rates.
 Flexibility to address different pandemic conditions
(E.g.: severity and vaccine supply)
 Public Health Unit characteristics (e.g.: PHU and
Primary Care capacity, population, and geography).
 Immunization objectives (E.g.: Different approaches
for different objectives. Is the objective to vaccinate
specific priority/high risk groups first before making
vaccines available to the general public?).
Priority groups sequencing and guidelines also presented
problems. For example, there was a lack of public under-
standing and both Public Health and Primary Care/Family
physicians had problems adhering to the guidelines. Add-
itional priority group problems were identified in PHUs
where Primary Care/Family physicians were expected to
vaccinate. Physicians voiced concern or refused to vaccin-
ate because their families and staff were not considered a
priority group and they were concerned about transmit-
ting infection to them. They indicated that their families
and staff should be considered a priority group in order to
remove this as a barrier to physician participation. Thus,
there is a clear need to further evaluate priority groups
and vaccine sequencing policy.
In addition, there was a common perception that most
of the vaccines were delivered after a point when they
would have effectively impacted the outcome of the pan-
demic. Participants in all three project phases indicated
that timely access to the vaccine and the capacity to vac-
cinate many people very quickly were two important
components of a good mass immunization model. Local
Medical Officers of Health indicated that the critical time
period when vaccines were most needed to be delivered
was just before infection rates were peaking. However,
there was a sense that the required supply of vaccines was
not available until after this time period and consequently
that many people received the vaccines when infection
rates and risk were much lower. Given this, one of the
Medical Officers of Health suggested that the rate of
immunization (E.g., percent of the target population or
priority group vaccinated per day) when needed was a
more important measure than the frequently reported
percent of the total population vaccinated.
Notable Quotes on Mass Immunization and Vaccine
Sequencing Guidelines
 “…with a limited supply of vaccine and ‘priority
groups’ the best model is to keep vaccine delivery in
the hands of Public Health – and a mass clinicapproach is the best. If there was not a limited
supply of vaccine the best model would be one
where the vaccine was shared by both Public Health
and other providers.” (Provincial Chief Medical
Officer of Health)
 “We probably still would have used the Public
Health directed model even if there was not going
to be a shortage of vaccine. Trying to distribute to
thousands of doctors would be a problem in an
emergency situation. Mass clinics are still more
efficient but there is a need to adapt for rural
regions where there are not enough people for a
Mass Immunization Clinic.” (Provincial Chief
Medical Officer of Health)
 “The Province should incorporate in its pandemic
plan the use of Primary Care and others as vaccine
delivery agents. Their plan excluded that and we
know from our experience and from having done
the math that if we’d had to do this without
partners it would have taken us a year to fully
vaccinate the population. We need the entire system
to be able to make this work effectively”. (PHU
Medical Officer of Health)
 “ We need to get as much participation from as
much of the population as possible … thus clinics
are ok but people are used to going to their MDs for
immunizations … we need an integrated approach.”
(Primary Care Physician)
 “Our problem was that although the categories
made perfect sense to us because we were
healthcare providers the public didn’t understand.
The Ministry and Public Health Agency of Canada
could have done a better job of communicating the
rationale behind the priority lists to the public.”
(Primary Care Physician)
 “We took what we thought were reasonable
measures to stick within the list, but if someone
showed up we did not refuse them the vaccine.
If a mother showed up with a two year old and a ten
year old, we would vaccinate the whole family.”
“The priority group approach doesn’t really work in
small communities.” (PHU Medical Officer of Health)
5) Provincial policy and northern and rural public health
units
There was a sense among respondents in northern or
rural areas that provincial pandemic policy was “Toronto-
centric” and didn’t adequately acknowledge that PHUs lo-
cated in northern or rural areas and also that Aboriginal
communities have different characteristics compared to
Toronto and other urban centres. Expressed differences
included: PHU capacity & size, available health human
resources, cultural, population density, age, health status,
number of persons/household, geographic, Primary Care
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Primary Care during the regular flu season, and typical
communication between PHUs and the public (E.g.,
weekly papers). Given this, key informants indicated the
need to consider developing different PIPs and provincial
supports and flexible guidelines that better address the
characteristics of Aboriginal communities and northern/
rural PHUs.
“We need to understand that pH1N1 impacts differently
on the Aboriginal population.” (Health Policy Analyst)
Discussion
In some degree, the pH1N1 experience was traumatic
for both Public Health and Primary Care/Family physi-
cians in Ontario. A clear theme common to participants
in all three project phases was the amount of passion
generated as a result of the questions and memories of
the pH1N1 experience.
For all, this was a first attempt at implementing a local
pandemic plan. Many felt constrained by a combination
of factors. For example, Public Health officials; who were
interested in collaborating with Primary Care/Family phy-
sicians in developing the PIPs, found it difficult to engage
Primary Care and indicated that the main barrier was that
Primary Care physicians are not a single organization.
(Note: Public Health and Primary Care respondents both
agreed that Ontario’s Family Health Teams are well posi-
tioned to help address this barrier). Public Health was also
affected by the unpredictable or insufficient vaccine
supply. They were sometimes unable to recruit sufficient
numbers of qualified part-time emergency personnel to
staff immunization clinics because they were not available.
Other staffing problems included delays because formal
agreements were not already in place or barriers caused
by collective agreements that didn’t have specific emer-
gency clauses which would have increased PHU flexibility
to respond during the pandemic.
Primary Care/Family physicians also described barriers
to collaborating with Public Health and participating in
the local PIPs. Examples included: “overly onerous gov-
ernment requirements” for vaccine documentation and
handling guidelines, lack of information and timely guar-
antees to ensure the availability of the funding required
to remunerate physicians and staff for their additional
services and supplies, and fear of infecting their families
and staff given that they were not considered priority
populations. Physicians wanted policies, guidelines and
messages from Public Health (provincial and federal) and
provincial Medical Organizations to be better coordinated
and not contradictory. Physicians also frequently stated
that they felt underutilized during the implementation of
the mass immunization components of the local PIPs, and
thought they should have been more involved in the PIP
development process. There was almost 100% agreementby Public Health and Primary Care physicians for the need
for increased Public Health/Primary Care collaboration
and for the following statement: “We were very lucky
that pH1N1 was not more severe”.
Given the above, one may ask the question: what
could have happened if the pandemic were more se-
vere and we experienced much higher infection and
mortality rates? Examples provided during the key in-
formant interviews suggested outcomes we would likely
have experienced included: a) PHUs would not be able to
implement their PIPs as designed because of illnesses
among key PHU staff or the planned nursing agency staff
and other temporary emergency staff; b) infrastructure
breakdown associated with illness among people in key in-
frastructure positions who were not on the initial priority
lists (E.g., electricity plant personnel, city bus drivers, po-
lice, etc.) and who were essential to keep the power run-
ning or were needed transport materials such as vaccines;
c) policy and funding problems that delayed the quick
implementation of influenza assessment centres (FACs)
would serve to overwhelm emergency rooms, community
health centres and Primary Care providers; and d) public
panic and security problems associated with fear, priority
group sequencing and high demand for both the vaccine
and anti-viral medications at the clinics and pharmacies.
Conclusion
At the local PHU level more detailed planning is needed.
The most effective PIPs will likely be those developed to
incorporate a comprehensive total system response that in-
cludes locally organized Primary Care (E.g., Family Health
Teams and Community Health Centres) and other primary
care providers and system stakeholders.
Mass immunization models should be flexible versus
an ‘all or none’ response. They should have incremental
approaches based upon different scenarios that address:
pandemic severity, vaccine supply, local conditions (E.g.,
healthcare capacity, health human resources, and usual
influenza season model) and immunization objectives (E.g.,
to vaccinate the total population, en mass, quickly and
without prejudice, versus using sequencing guidelines to
first immunize a clearly defined hierarchy of priority groups
considered to be at increased risk).
While an important measure of a good mass immu-
nization model is the ability to vaccinate the most
people in the shortest time period. The effectiveness
and efficiency with which this can be accomplished is
largely contingent upon reliable access to a vaccine
supply and the availability of a sufficient number of
appropriately trained health professionals to support
the model. This is affected by Public Health Unit and
local Primary Care capacity which in turn is affected
by regional models of health system organization and
their components that serve to increase or decrease
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tions. Given this, planning at multiple levels is import-
ant. It is imperative that important decisions are made
and agreed upon prior to a crisis. Examples include
which providers have the first (and then incremental)
access to the vaccines and when different approaches
are warranted because of specific pandemic conditions.
We also have to ask the question: what happens when
something goes wrong such as the loss of key providers,
first responders or people in key infrastructure positions
who become sick? Do we have backup plans? This is im-
portant and is a fit for the following expressed by Masotti
et al., (2006, p73): “a reduction in the capacity of even one
of the key health service providers inevitably impacts the
resources and consequently the capacities of the others”
[10]. Thus, it makes sense to recognize that pandemics
affect the whole community; whereas, an integrated
community-wide response may be the best approach to
decrease the impact of a pandemic.
The term ‘Community – Pandemic Influenza Plan’ has
been used to describe the ‘integrated community-wide re-
sponse’ mentioned above. We broadly defined Community-
PIPs as: PIPs that were developed collaboratively by
multiple community stakeholders (E.g., Primary Care,
Acute Care, Long-term Care, Emergency Care, Phar-
macy, Police, Fire Department, School Districts and
Municipal Government) and where there was a sense of
community ownership. Community-PIPs are broader in
scope than Public Health Unit PIPs that may focus on
immunization and include agreed upon roles and re-
sponsibilities of the different stakeholder groups with
the objective of implementing an integrated approach.
Few of Ontario’s PHUs had fully developed Community-
PIPs. However, both Public Health and Primary Care
respondents generally agreed that there was value in de-
veloping more locally integrated responses such as
Community-PIPs.
Limitations
This three phase comparative analysis study used key
informant interviews (Phase 1 and Phase 3) and the
Nominal Group Technique (Phase 2) to identify ideas,
lessons learned, components of Pandemic Influenza
Plans that worked well or didn’t work well, policy
suggestions for improvement and also to generate con-
sensus. Limitations included not provided operational
definitions in all categories of inquiry and not knowing
if individuals had the same understanding. Also, inter-
pretation of the results from the many key informant
interviews (E.g., main themes identified) may have been
influenced by researcher bias.
The main focus of all three phases was on the pH1N1
experience among Ontario Public Health Units. Thus
the results may not be generalized outside of Ontario.The high level of participation by Ontario’s Public Health
Units where 29 of 36 Medical Officers of Health agreed to
participate strengthened the project. However, a limitation
was the degree of self-selection among the Primary Care/
Family physicians; identified as physician leaders by their
Medical Organizations, who agreed to participate in the
key informant interviews and the symposium.
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